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Abstract
The Fukushima nuclear disaster in March 2011 shook Japan and the whole world. However, 
the eventual outcome was the restoration of the long-entrenched nuclear power policy regime 
after a period of blame-shifting among politicians and electricity company managers. Why is 
this nuclear policy so resilient? This article proposes two hypotheses: one focusing on politics in 
time and the other on politics in space. The separation of political processes between short-
term and long-term contexts leads to the blurring of responsibility for accumulating nuclear 
risk. The relationship of center-periphery dependency prevailing in Japan imposes a “double-
risk society” situation on so-called “atom villages,” which continue to accept energy-related 
facilities because they feel that they must choose between nuclear and socio-economic risks.
1. The Politics of Time and Space in Unexpected Crises
This study explores the time and space horizons of the politics of crisis by examining the 
background and impact of the disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in 
Japan following the massive earthquake on March 11, 2011. 
After the Fukushima accident, the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) management 
and mainstream nuclear power experts stressed that the whole development was “unexpected.” 
Former Prime Minister Noda endorsed this explanation, referring to the “optimistic 
assumptions” made about disaster risks when speaking at the second Nuclear Security 
Summit in Seoul on March 26, 2012. 
Yet Möller and Wikman-Svahn (2011) suggest that the Fukushima disaster could be seen 
as a “black elephant” rather than a “black swan.” A “black swan” refers to a high-impact 
event that exceeds reasonable expectations and could not have been predicted in advance, in 
―　　―
contrast to a “white swan,” which is readily visible. On the other hand, a “black elephant” is 
an extraordinary event, the likelihood of  which is ignored despite existing evidence. 
Regardless of whether a crisis is a “black swan” or a “black elephant,” it is the outcome of 
political contestation and construction. The key question to consider is who (or what) should 
be held responsible for long-term nuclear power policy and its result.
As Pierson (2003) notes, much political research is geared toward short time horizons in 
terms of both cause and outcome; he calls this the “tornado” type of account. However, 
many social processes may take a longer time to unfold. Long-term types of explanations are 
more appropriate for what Pierson calls the “earthquake” type of events, which have rapid 
outcomes but very slow-moving causal processes; the “meteorite/extinction” type, which has 
very recent causes and slow-moving outcomes; and the “global warming” type, which has 
long-term causal processes and outcomes. As Lewin (2007) emphasizes, political 
accountability can be achieved only when a choice is fully presented and decided upon. 
However, choices are shaped and constrained by the politics of time and space. Thus, I first 
examine the following hypothesis on the politics of time, which I will apply to the case of 
Fukushima.  
  Hypothesis 1: To the extent that short-term political processes are separated from long-
term political processes, policy choices and political accountability remain diverted or 
obscured.  
The separation of political processes in time is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1　The Politics of Nuclear Power in Time and Space  
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Source: Pierson (2003), Table 5.1, p. 179. Words in italics were added by the present author for the 
purpose of this article.
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Second, the politics of space should also be addressed. According to Gould’s comparison 
of political responses in Europe in the wake of the Chernobyl accident, “West Germany 
showed what a vigorous federal structure could achieve,” due to two conditions in the 
country: the political pressures brought to bear by the Green Party, and strong local power. 
Gould also observes, “There is no question in my mind that there was a direct and strong 
correlation between the degree to which a country had made itself  dependent on atomic 
power and the degree to which it employed the tactic of suppressing information” (1990: 
115–117). In countries most dependent on atomic power, such as France and Belgium (over 
60%), information was most likely to be either manipulated or suppressed by the 
government, which were highly centralized and relied on advice from atomic scientists. 
Poland and other then-socialist countries that had committed to building Soviet-designed 
reactors also had many reasons to control information flow.
Based on this observation, I propose a second hypothesis, which assumes that a highly 
centralized and unequal state-society relation is most likely to leave no alternatives to 
nuclear-driven energy policy, whereas a decentralized political structure is more susceptible to 
policy and partisan alternatives.
  Hypothesis 2: To the extent that the center-periphery relation is hierarchical and charac-
terized by dependency, long-term policy alternatives are likely to be deterred.
2. The Politics of Time before and after Fukushima
The Short/Short Context
The politics of  crisis in the short/short context (i.e., short-term causes and short-term 
outcomes) after Fukushima developed into a chaotic political blame-shifting game.
During the knife-edge situation at the Fukushima nuclear power plant, the entire 
population watched the televised statements by Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano with 
breathless concern. People felt insecure as they listened to reports of helicopters watering the 
site or reportedly “heroic” fire brigades, wondering what Edano’s words about “no immediate 
ill effect on health”  really meant. However, people had few choices other than compulsory (in 
areas designated by a series of concentric circles ) or voluntary (such as for mothers with 
small children) evacuation or leaving the matter passively in the hands of the government 
and TEPCO. 
As national securitization (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde 1998) of  the nuclear accident 
proceeded, blame-shifting prevailed among political leaders and TEPCO managers. The 
opposition Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) politicians, such as former Prime Minister 
―　　―
Shinzo Abe and party leader Sadakazu Tanigaki, made public the information that Prime 
Minister Kan had needlessly ordered a suspension of water injection. This information, 
perhaps disseminated by a high official in the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
(METI), turned out to be false (Yamaguchi 2012). In the Diet’s Independent Investigation 
Commission, TEPCO CEO Masataka Shimizu and Director-General Tsunehisa Katsumata 
both denied having planned a total withdrawal of their employees from the nuclear plant, 
while the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) cabinet members insisted that the company had 
suggested this.  
In the meantime, four different public and private investigation units were established. 
First, TEPCO issued a report on December 2, 2011 (TEPCO 2011) that reiterated the 
“unexpected” factors of this accident, such as tsunami waves exceeding 10 meters in height 
and the total loss of emergency power supply and equipment for accident management. 
Nevertheless, journalists discovered a report showing that TEPCO had considered 
countermeasures against tsunami waves higher than previous assumptions, as well as another 
oral report that a working group under the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) 
had warned of the possibility of a huge earthquake and tsunami striking East Japan, like the 
one that occurred in A.D. 896 (Asahi Shimbun, March 12, 2012 & June 13, 2012). These 
warnings, whether consciously or due to lack of attention, were never taken seriously by 
TEPCO.2) 
The Long/Short Context
The long/short context (long-term causes, short-term outcomes) in existence prior to the 
Fukushima disaster can be traced back to the consolidation of an unaccountable nuclear 
energy policy regime in post-war Japan.
According to the science historian Hitoshi Yoshioka (2011), the atomic energy policy in 
Japan has been characterized by a “state-directed, privately managed” policy regime. This 
regime made both democratic accountability for public energy policy and market competition 
based on costs and rationalization opaque. How was this particular regime consolidated? 
The introduction of atomic energy into Japan in the 1950s derived from the U.S. policy of 
providing nuclear power technology to its allies during the Cold War. In the domestic 
political arena, individual proponents such as Yasuhiro Nakasone, a nationalist politician 
and later Prime Minister, and Matsutaro Shoriki, a business leader who would later become 
a government minister, pushed hard for the first atomic development budget in 1954. The 
business sector as a whole was skeptical of  state control but eager to minimize the 
development costs. The tug-of-war between businesses and the Ministry of International 
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Trade and Industry (MITI) led to a compromise: the creation of the Japan Atomic Power 
Company, funded by both the government and private companies. This coexistence regime 
allowed the private companies to seek profits while leaving infrastructure improvement and 
subsidies to the government’s discretion. This regime was consolidated from the 1960s to the 
1980s, with support from the introduction of a base-rate scheme of electricity charges. Under 
this system, the more power companies invested in huge development plans, the more they 
would be allowed to charge consumers for electricity.
This “state-directed, privately managed” nuclear energy policy regime fit with the 
conservative development politics long pursued by the LDP government. The decline of LDP 
politics, tightening of budgets, and global warming discourses created a watershed moment 
in Japanese politics in 2009, namely, a change of government for the first time in more than 
half  a century. The new DPJ government looked at policy alternatives, such as emission 
trading and a strengthened feed-in-tariff  scheme. However, the mid-term roadmap planned 
by the Ministry of  Environment was set aside by METI (formerly MITI), and the 
government contemplated the option of withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol and exporting 
nuclear power plants to developing countries under the title of a “new growth strategy.” In 
the wake of the Fukushima disaster, the DPJ has experienced internal disunity on this issue, 
and the DPJ’s policy of  “departure from dependence on nuclear energy” became more 
blurred in the days of the Noda cabinet, launched in September 2011, than in the previous 
Kan cabinet. 
The Short/Long Context
The politics of (lost) accountability in a short/long context (short-term causes, long-term 
outcomes) is developing around radiation and decommissioning, issues that are now hotly 
contested between mainstream experts and critical experts and journalists.
Hiroshi Tasaka, a nuclear expert, who had served the government as a cabinet adviser, 
delivered a talk titled “The Pandora’s Box that the Fukushima Atomic Accident Opened” at 
the Japan Press Club. Since then, he has warned against “groundless optimistic relief” and 
pointed to “bunching” risks and costs. Among the unsolved risks, he enumerates not only the 
uncontrollability of a destroyed reactor (even though it is described as in “cold shutdown”), 
but also growing amounts of contaminated water, long-term ecological pollution, reactor 
decommissioning that will span many decades, socio-psychological costs, and the unsolvable 
problem of permanent disposal (Tasaka 2012). 
Journalists have blamed the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) and the Ministry of 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology for diffusing unsound, shaky 
―　　―
benchmarks regarding security against low-dose radiation to a broad range of  people, 
including children (Hizumi & Kino 2012). Onai and Shirabe (2012) criticize the report of the 
Working Group on the Risk Management of Low-Dose Exposures, which established the 
benchmark for evacuation and removal work. The report claims that 20 mSv of radiation 
dose is a level sufficiently low to avoid risk and that this threshold is justified by 
internationally agreed-upon scientific knowledge, including that of  　United Nations 
Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation(UNSCEAR) and International 
Commission on Radiological Protection(ICRP). However, UNSCEAR and ICRP’s original 
reports attach more weight to “social trust” and “participation of all important stakeholders,” 
two conditions ignored by the Working Group, which prefers an expert-driven 
“enlightenment” model. Such a top-down risk management policy would have deprived the 
inhabitants of their right to evacuate children to areas with lower radiation levels. 
3. The Politics of Accountability in the Center/Periphery and Long/Long 
Contexts
The politics of time in the long/long context and the politics of space in the center-periphery 
context overlap and contribute to the most strongly entrenched factors contributing to the 
resilience of nuclear power policy in Japan. The dependency relationship between the center 
and the periphery contributed to policy inertia, as did the paradoxical adherence of the 
“victimized zones” to nuclear facilities. 
Kainuma (2011) focuses on the development of a second source of support for “atom 
villages,” located among metropolitan elites, in addition to the bureaucracy-industry complex 
supporting atomic energy at the national level. Typically, rural municipalities were chosen as 
“atom villages” because their location was removed from a metropolitan area but still 
sufficiently convenient to supply electricity consumed by an urban population.
In these “atom villages,” nuclear power plants appeared as a knight on a white horse. 
Instead of  causing devastating migration or disappointment about plans for heavy and 
chemical industries, nuclear plants regenerated these communities by bringing jobs to the 
area and increasing the demand for housing  and services. In fact, locals were generally 
happy about the huge financial transfer legitimized by highly technical discourses (Pickett 
2002). 
The 1974 power source siting laws (Dengen Sanpo) brought about huge subsidies, which, 
in turn, encouraged the host local governments to initiate wide-ranging public building 
projects such as roads, ports, and facilities for sports, garbage disposal, health care, 
education, social welfare, agriculture, and tourism. Furthermore, regional development 
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projects such as the promotion of local traditional industries, human resource development, 
and environmental protection were supported. In a word, nuclear subsidies could be expected 
to cover virtually all the activities that local municipalities could imagine. In August 2011, 
Tokyo Shimbun reported that the government budget for nuclear energy over the previous ten 
years amounted to 4.5 trillion yen, around 40% of which was earmarked for “siting policy.” 
That means that around 180 billion yen every year were earmarked for this purpose, and 
host localities received more than 60% of that amount (Tokyo Shimbun, August 14, 2011). 
Figure 2 shows the nuclear facility host municipalities covered by the ambient-area enterprise 
support programs. 
However, after receiving their initial financial support associated with facility construction, 
these local communities faced the prospect of  diminishing transfers. This financial 
mechanism induced “atom villages” to accept expansions of, or additional, nuclear facilities 
(Ishibashi et al. 2011), which Kainuma describes as “addiction” on the part of the “victimized 
zones.”
Among Japan’s many “atom villages,” Rokkashomura village in Aomori Prefecture 
occupies a particularly paradoxical position. This village and adjacent localities, located on a 
peninsula of the northernmost prefecture on the Japanese mainland, were offered national 
nuclear fuel cycling projects in the mid-1980s, following the failure of a regional industrial 
development plan in the late 1960s and 1970s. If  this acceptance is reversed , the state and 
the industry will lose one of the country’s main willing recipients of such facilities,  and the 
localities will lose their economic lifeline (Funabashi, Hasegawa, & Ijima 2012: 85–118).
Survey research conducted in September 2003 (Kayano 2005) found that villagers were 
ambivalent but that their perspectives were dominated by economic concerns. Among the 
survey respondents, 57.2% acknowledged the presence of both risk and positive economic 
effects, 25.4% recognized the economic effects but not risk, 13.8% affirmed risk but not 
economic effects, and 3.5% perceived neither risk nor economic effects as resulting from the 
projects. These results indicate that a strong majority had positive views of the economic 
impact of the nuclear fuel cycling facilities. More than half  of these indicated that they had 
been negative at first but later changed their mind. This survey shows the attitude 
transformation in communities that nuclear fuel cycling activities have induced over the past 
20 years.
There have been international concerns that Japan’s nuclear fuel cycling projects would 
accumulate plutonium̶which could potentially be diverted to atomic weaponry̶and since 
Fukushima it has become much more difficult to regenerate the reprocessing project. But it is 
no easier to find a policy alternative, due to the asymmetrical interdependence between the 
―　　―
Figure 2 Nuclear power siting in mostly peripheral municipalities covered by ambient-area enterprise 
support programs
Source: Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, “Dengenricchi Seido no Gaiyo” (Overview of Electric 
Power Source Siting), http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/about/pamphlet/pdf/dengenrichi.pdf, accessed 
February 22, 2016.
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state and the nuclear industry, on one hand, and the small localities and the rural prefectures 
on the other hand. 
4. Where Have All the Alternatives Gone?
Nuclear energy policy in Japan has been distinguished by the presence of  a dominant 
coalition defending a state-directed, privately managed policy regime that is opposed only by 
weak protest movements (Honda 2005).
There have been viable cycles of  anti-nuclear protest activities in Japan. Anti-nuclear 
movements often viewed litigation as a direct means of  disrupting nuclear power 
construction and operations. However, the judicial branch tends to acquiesce to the logic of 
the dominant position among nuclear scientists, although the need for safety review was 
confirmed in the Ikata nuclear plant case in the 1970s. The plaintiff  in this case was 
supported by critical (and thus low-ranked) nuclear power researchers from the University of 
Kyoto. These experts were concerned about the risk of  meltdown in case of  a loss of 
emergency power supply (which would become a reality at Fukushima) and also about active 
faults lying underneath nuclear plants. However, the lawsuit was unsuccessful. A quarter-
century later, a lower court decision in October 2007, in the Hamaoka Atomic Power Plant 
case, again favored the defendant. The decision stated, “We must avoid considering too 
seriously an abstract possibility of a huge earthquake.” Shortly thereafter, the Chuetsu Oki 
earthquake damaged the Kashiwazaki Kariwa plants (Kaido 2011). Thus, the judiciary can 
be seen as another contributor to the consolidation of an unaccountable nuclear energy 
policy regime. 
Nevertheless, the most relevant challenge took the form of local revolts that occurred in 
the 1990s. In 1994, local residents in Makimachi, a small town in Niigata Prefecture, set up 
the Association for Local Referendum, led by Mr. Sasaguchi, a sake brewer. After being 
elected mayor a year later, Sasaguchi decided to hold a symposium and then a referendum 
on nuclear power plants. The referendum attracted 88.29% voter turnout, with 60.85% voting 
against and 38.55% for the nuclear power plants (Honda 2005, 253–258). 
In Fukushima, Governor Eisaku Sato, who had been an LDP member of the Diet, refused 
to acquiesce to the Mixed Uranium-Plutonium Oxide Fuel for Nuclear Reactors (MOX) 
program for the Fukushima Daiichi plant. Against strong pressures exercised by the power 
industry, bureaucracy, and conservative media, Sato suspended the MOX program in 2000 on 
the grounds that the information and explanations provided to the local population were not 
credible and contained bogus data on MOX fuel. However, Fukushima’s prefectural revolt 
came to a halt when Sato was charged with bribery in 2006. Sato received a two-year 
―　　―
sentence, even though the court acknowledged that he had received “zero yen” (Sato 2011). 
While he was appealing to the Supreme Court, the new governor, Mr. Yuhei Sato, announced 
acceptance of the MOX program at the Fukushima Daiichi plant.
According to an Asahi Shimbun opinion poll in May 2012, 29% of respondents supported 
and 54% opposed restarting the Oi nuclear power plant. Additionally, 20% trusted, to a 
certain extent, the safety measures for nuclear power established by the government, 51% did 
not trust them much, and 22% did not trust them at all. Moreover, 44% agreed that they 
would support the discontinuance of nuclear power generation even if  that decision brought 
with it the possibility of an electricity shortage and inconveniences in daily life, whereas 47% 
did not. These responses expressed a notable lack of public confidence in the accounts of 
nuclear plant operations given by the government and experts.
On June 8, 2012, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda announced that he had decided to 
resume operations at the Oi nuclear power plant. He expressed gratitude to the host 
prefecture, saying that “Fukui Prefecture and Oi have supported the Kansai region” and that 
“We must renew our respect for and gratitude to the host governments” (Asahi Shimbun 
AJW, June 8, 2012,  https://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201206090053). In 
the December 2012 election, the LDP returned to power, and Abe’s second cabinet decided 
to go ahead with resuming operation of  nuclear power plants, starting with the Sendai 
plants in Kagoshima in 2015 and then the Takahama plants in 2016, after obtaining the 
approval of  the host localities and prefectures.3)  Aside from this restoration of  nuclear 
power, the Abe government introduced liberalization of the electricity retail market, from 
which not only consumers but also TEPCO (at least on a short-term basis) could expect to 
benefit (Asahi Shimbun, February 21, 2016). 
5. Beyond Japan and “Atom Villages”
Following the Fukushima accident, the politics of crisis in the short context was prominent, 
obscuring the long-term contexts. The outcomes included the blaming of ex-Prime Minister 
Kan instead of those responsible for the “state-directed, privately managed” policy regime, 
fear of low-level radiation doses among the remaining residents and their future descendants, 
and no substantial policy revisions with regard to nuclear power. 
In this way, the Japanese nuclear power policy regime confirms Hypothesis 1. The 
obscuring of policy choice is also buttressed by the continuing dependence of host localities 
on the nuclear economy, which validates Hypothesis 2.
The European states took different paths in response to the Fukushima accident in spring 
2011. The Merkel government in Germany froze its own bill for nuclear operation extensions 
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only three days after the accident in Japan. Chancellor Merkel set up two advisory boards, 
the Technical Nuclear Safety Commission and the Ethics Commission, to shape authoritative 
principles for the future of energy policy, basically in line with (but also in several respects 
ahead of) the Atomausstieg policy of the former Red-Green coalition. In Italy, the July 2011 
national referendum overturned Prime Minister Berlusconi’s policy proposals, which 
included restarting domestic nuclear power.
In contrast, France is the most prominent case of a “state-directed, privately managed” 
policy regime in Europe. After Fukushima, President Sarkozy stood firmly behind the 
nuclear energy industry, saying that it supported “the power, pride, and independence” of  the 
country. François Hollande, who defeated Sarkozy in the May 2012 presidential election, 
committed to a moderate reduction of nuclear power and announced the closure of one 
nuclear plant at Fessenheim. However, the local voters expressed strong resistance against 
this idea in the National Assembly election (Le Monde, June 5, 2012). 
The German and Italian cases may show the relevance of  open political opportunity 
structures such as federalism or referenda.4)  Moreover, Chancellor Merkel’s decision was not 
limited to temporal relief  of mass fear, but influenced future policy principles as well (though 
these were subsequently challenged by business). In other words, the German leader intended 
to ensure that accountability for her nuclear policy U-turn would be matched by a long-term 
account (Hypothesis 1). In addition, this political decision was made against the background 
of  a surge by the Green Party in Lander election campaigns in late March 2011, as 
demonstrated by the 24.2% support that the Greens received in Baden-Württemberg and the 
15.4% who voted for Green in Rhineland-Palatinate (Spiegel Online, March 28, 2011). That 
development evidences the influence of strong local power, as Gould put it, in stark contrast 
to the center-periphery dependency in Japan (Hypothesis 2). 
In terms of center-periphery dependency, Lithuania is one of the most comparable cases 
to Japan in Europe. In the 1970s, the Soviet government planned the construction of the 
Ignalina nuclear plant in Lithuania to supply electricity to the whole northwestern region of 
the USSR, and the two reactors began operations in 1984 and 1986. The Chernobyl accident 
and the glasnost reforms prompted the Lithuanian population to express anxiety about 
health issues. However, the inhabitants of Visaginas, where the Ignalina plant is located, 
expressed much less concern about the danger of the power plant nearby. This seemingly 
paradoxical response resembles that of  the “atom villages” in Japan. Rinkevicius (2000) 
describes this communal perception as the result of a “double-risk society” in the sense that 
people accept the risks of nuclear technology because they believe that a nuclear phase-out 
would present the risk of losing local employment, welfare, social stability, and quality of 
―　　―
life. Here, risk derived from the first modernity and risk derived from the second (Beck 2013) 
are overlaid not in order but in time. 
But are hypotheses 1 and 2, implying the continuation of  the “double-risk society,” 
irrevocable and unchangeable? Figure 3 shows the location of existing nuclear power plants 
along with more than 30 localities that blocked planned nuclear plant construction in Japan. 
Those “nonconformist” localities, such as small towns along the Kii Peninsula coasts and 
Iwaishima Island in the Seto Inland Sea, often have strong communal ties, such as fishermen’
s cooperatives, with deeper historical origins. The local resitances, whether successful or not, 
were never made without difficulty. However, Shokan Tachibana, a Buddhist priest living 
only 8 kilometers away from the Tsuruga nuclear plant, insists, “The longer we resist, the 
more likely nuclear power plants will be economically ruined, to the point of withdrawal.” 
His remark sounds like a popular but strategic vision that may transcend nuclear-related 
center-periphery dependency in the long term. 
The initial securitization of nuclear power risk did not lead to a policy changeover in the 
short-term context, but it caused a mid-term effect that has normalized citizens’ protest 
Figure 3　Localities that blocked planned nuclear power plant construction
Black dots: Existing nuclear power plants in Japan
⑪－34：Localities that blocked planned nuclear power plant construction Source: 
Yamaaki (2012), p. 3.
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politics in Japan (Gonoi 2012). The anti-nuclear power movement culminated in 2012 but 
was followed by anti-State Secrecy Law movements in 2013–2014 and anti-military legislation 
movements in 2015. The second of these three movements led to the establishment of the 
Students Against Secret Protection Law (SASPL), which developed into the Students 
Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy (SEALDs) in the third movement. These new 
waves of student action are creating a new political culture, such as by using rap music in 
demonstrations.
It is unknown whether such young urban civil-society movements and communal 
resistance can cut across the center-periphery gap and eventually work in tandem to change 
a nuclear power policy that has been entrenched in time and space (Ono 2016).
 1) This article is a revised and updated work based on my paper, “Politics of Accountability in 
Risk and Fear: Coping with the ‘Unexpected’ in Japan and Europe,” presented at the 2012 
IPSA World Congress, Madrid, July 8–12, and on my chapter, “Risk Society,” in Hiroshi Honda 
and Takashi Horie (eds), Datsu-genpatsu no Hikakuseijigaku (Comparative Politics of Anti-
Nuclear Power), Tokyo: Hosei University Press, 2014. It was supported by JSPS KAKENHI 
Grants Number 23330043, 26285035, and 24243021. 
 2) ENSI, the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate, has clearly pointed to the lack of 
learning ability in the organization before Fukushima (ENSI 2011).    
 3) On February. 24, 2016, the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) announced that the No. 1 
and 2 reactors of  Takahama nuclear power plant in Fukui Prefecture met the new safety 
standards. The NRA’s decision may lead to extension of the operation of the aging reactors to 
up to 60 years, beyond 40-year limit that the DPJ government had introduced (Asahi Shimbun 
AJW, Feb.25, 2016, https://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/editorial/AJ201602250031).
 4) The Italian case demonstrates a more complex context. In Italy, nuclear power development 
had faced a bottleneck since the 1970s, partly because of technical failure and partly because of 
political struggles involving Christian Democratic factions as well as the strong oil industry. A 
national referendum in 1987 led to the decision to abandon the three laws on nuclear power 
development in Italy. The anti-Berlusconi opposition that campaigned for the national 
referenda in 2011 intended to combine the issues of privatization of water supply, immunity of 
ministers, and the plan to restart nuclear power (Ito 2012). Thus, the opposition challenged the 
incumbent government by questioning its accounts of both short-term and long-term issues. 
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